Using an international sample of banks, we study how differences in religiosity across countries affect earnings management. Given that religiosity is a major source of morality and ethical behavior, it may reduce excessive risk taking and act as deterrence for earnings manipulations. Therefore, we predict lower earnings management in societies that have higher religiosity. Consistent with expectations, our cross-country analysis indicates that religiosity is negatively related to income-increasing earnings management for loss-avoidance and just-meeting-or-beating prior year’s earnings. We also find that (...) religiosity reduces income-increasing earnings management through abnormal loan loss provisions. In additional tests, we document that religiosity increases the information value of bank earnings, with both earnings persistence and cash flow predictability being enhanced by higher religiosity. For the crisis period analysis, our evidence shows that banks in countries with higher religiosity exhibit lower probability of reporting asset deterioration and lower probability of having poor performance. (shrink)

Using an international sample of firms from 32 countries, we study the relation between media independence and corporate tax aggressiveness. We measure media independence by the extent of private ownership and competition in the media industry. Using an indicator variable for tax aggressiveness when the firm’s corporate tax avoidance measure is within the top quartile of each country-industry combination, we find strong evidence that media independence is associated with a lower likelihood of tax aggressiveness, after controlling for other institutional determinants, (...) including home-country tax system characteristics. We also find that the effect of media independence is more pronounced when the legal environment is weaker, and when the information environment is less transparent. We contribute to the business ethics literature by documenting the role of independent media as an external monitoring mechanism in constraining corporate tax aggressiveness. (shrink)

We examine the implications of social trust for auditor reporting conservatism. Using a sample of listed companies in China, we find that clients located in high-trust regions are less likely to receive a non-clean audit opinion. This negative impact of social trust on auditor reporting conservatism increases when the client’s parent firm operates in a region of higher social trust, suggesting that social trust is contagious from a parent firm to its subsidiaries in a consolidated entity. We provide evidence that (...) the trust contagion is more pronounced for clients with a higher percentage of parent-appointed directors on their boards and clients whose parent firm has fewer subsidiaries. These findings indicate that monitoring and, to a lesser extent, personnel rotation may serve as potential channels of trust contagion. We also find that the impact of trust is more pronounced when the client is located closer to its audit firm, when the client’s parent firm is a state-owned enterprise or holds a higher percentage of the client’s shares, and when the client is associated with greater discretionary accruals. We provide further evidence that it is client rather than auditor trustworthiness that influences auditor reporting conservatism, auditors charge trustworthy clients lower fees, and clients from high-trust regions are less likely to manipulate earnings. Overall, our evidence suggests that social trust alleviates auditor concern about client moral hazard. (shrink)

Prior research has examined several ethical questions related to executive compensation. The issues that have received most attention are whether executives' pay is fair and justified by performance. Since more recent studies show that stock options grants constitute the single largest component in executive compensation, we examine the relations of these grants to economic determinants and corporate governance for firms in the stagnant stage of their lifecycle. We find that, on average, stock options grants comprise a significant portion of annual (...) CEO compensation (26.4%) for stagnant firms. We also find that economic (corporate governance) factors explain less (or more) of the cross-sectional variation in stock options grants for stagnant firms than for growth firms. Furthermore, we document lower pay-performance sensitivity (i.e., weaker incentive alignment) and no improvement in future firm performance from past stock options grants to CEOs of stagnant firms. In particular, our study provides empirical evidence on some inefficiencies associated with stock options grants to CEOs of low potential (stagnant) firms, a long-standing concern of business ethics researchers (Moriarty, 2005; Nichols and Subramaniam, 2001; Perel, 2003). Our results also provide support for the corporate governance reforms discussed in Matsumura and Shin (2005), especially those proposed provisions that curtail the power of CEOs in the governance of firms. (shrink)

We examine whether anti-corruption intensity strengthens tax enforcement effectiveness in China. Using hand-collected anti-corruption data and aggregate tax enforcement data, which include the probability of tax audits and tax deficiencies, for a sample of 11,687 firm-year observations from 2012 to 2017, we find that anti-corruption intensity increases the deterrence role and the enforcement role of tax audits. We also identify the fear effect as a possible channel through which anti-corruption intensity affects tax enforcement effectiveness. Overall, the results indicate that anti-corruption (...) intensity can improve a revenue agency’s effectiveness. (shrink)